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Book Reviews

BROTHER, CAN YOU PARADIGM?
REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. By Jed
Rubenfeld. 1 Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 2005.
Pp. ix + 241. $39.95.
Brannon P. Denning2

INTRODUCTION
Jed Rubenfeld's Revolution by Judiciary is an ambitious
search for a way out of the reductionist debate between
originalism and non-originalist interpretive theories that has
dominated constitutional theory since at least the mid-twentieth
century. Building on "commitmentarianism," a theory of
constitutionalism introduced in his previous book Freedom and
Time/ Rubenfeld argues that there is a structure to American
constitutional law-a structure that, once understood, reveals
more harmony than cacophony in much of constitutional doctrine.
This hidden structure can be accessed through what
Rubenfeld calls the "paradigm-case" method of constitutional
interpretation. Rubenfeld argues that all constitutional text is
derived from historic paradigm cases. The text embodies consti1. Robert R. Slaughter Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
2. Associate Professor of Law and Director of Faculty Development, Cumberland
School of Law, Samford University. Thanks to Brian Bix, Tim Lytton, Mike Ramsey, Bill
Ross, Howard Walthall, Norman Williams, and the students in my Spring 2006 Contemporary Constitutional Theory seminar-Maggie Harrell, Mike Higgins, Rebecca Hill, Joe
Hubbard, Trevor Jones, Dustin Kittel, Miles McGrane, and Thomas Richie-for many
helpful comments on and criticisms of earlier drafts.
3. lED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001).

81

82

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 23:81

tutional "commitments" made by the Framers, which bind subsequent generations. Judges then derive Application Understandings from those paradigm cases, which reflect the irreducible minimum substantive content of the textual commitment
(pp. 12-18). In other words, if the Constitution guarantees right R,
then the Application Understanding of R reflects what R, at a
minimum, prohibits the government from doing. Likewise, the
Application Understanding of constitutional power P reflects
what, at a minimum, the Constitution permits the branch exercising that power to do.
But Rubenfeld makes clear that his paradigm-case method
is not repackaged originalism. There may be other contemporaneous understandings about what the text did or didn't permit or
prohibit, but, he argues, these are mere "intentions" that do not
rise to the level of a commitment, which may form and be
sloughed off by courts as the years go on. These intentions he
terms No-Application Understandings (pp. 99-103).
Rubenfeld makes both normative and descriptive claims for
the paradigm-case method. Normatively, Rubenfeld argues that
constitutional law should respect past commitments by
grounding decisions in paradigm cases and their Application
Understandings. At the same time, by seeking and preserving
only the core commitments, the paradigm-case method, he
argues, avoids the stultifying effects of originalist interpretive
theories in which the intentions of the framers regarding
constitutional text exhaust the content of those textual
provisions (pp. 109-19). The mark of a true constitutional
commitment, Rubenfeld argues, is that it is made without
knowing quite what the commitment will ultimately entail. 4
(pp. 79-84).
Descriptively, he argues that the Court has instinctively
hewed to these core commitments throughout its history and
that his theory holds the key to resolving many so-called hard
cases that plague American constitutional doctrine-everything
from Brown v. Board of Education 5 to takings clause cases
(pp. 20-47). Recent cases on issues like gay rights and affirmative action would be more defensible, and less controversial, he
argues, were the Court to adopt explicitly the method he finds
implicit in its enduring decisions (pp. 184-201). Further, because
4. See pp. 79-84 (discussing JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN
RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (2000)).
5 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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the Court has instinctively adopted it, Rubenfeld maintains that
the paradigm-case method can be applied prospectively without
upsetting settled doctrine (pp. 15-18).
If it is indeed possible to identify, interpret, and apply the
paradigm cases and Application Understandings, then
Rubenfeld's theory would be extremely appealing. Ultimately,
however, I find the paradigm-case method flawed. In too many
crucial places, Rubenfeld has left too many questions about his
interpretive method unanswered.
Part II will summarize Rubenfeld's paradigm-case method.
Part III outlines my objections to his interpretive method: First,
he furnishes no criteria for correctly identifying and interpreting
historic paradigm cases; second, the process for constructing
Application Understandings from these paradigm cases is obscure, neither instructing how to choose among plausible, contending Application Understandings nor explaining the rule that
precedent should play in their construction or application; finally, Rubenfeld offers little sense how the paradigm-case
method operates to aid in the prospective resolution of constitutional cases. A brief conclusion follows in Part IV.
This review begins, however, with the distinction between
"commitments" and "intentions" developed in Rubenfeld's earlier work. 6 Part I will summarize his theory of "commitmentarianism" and tie it to the paradigm-case method described in more
detail in Part II.
I. COMMITMENTS VERSUS INTENTIONS
Rubenfeld argues throughout the first part of Revolution by
Judiciary that Application Understandings reflect specific constitutional commitments informed by paradigm historical cases and
enshrined in the Constitution's text. He juxtaposes these paradigm cases and the resulting Application Understandings that
arise from them against mere "intentions" reflected in NoApplication Understandings, which, in contrast to the Application Understandings, judges are free to discard over time. The
second third of his book, drawing on Freedom and Time, explains and defends this distinction, which Rubenfeld argues
separates paradigm-case interpretive method from both originalism and non-originalist interpretations of the Constitution. The
argument he offers is complex; what follows is, of necessity, only
6.

RUBENFELD, supra

note 3.
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a brief summary of his defense, which, itself, is a summary of his
earlier book. Nevertheless, I begin here, in media res, because
understanding comrnitmentarianism is key to understanding the
distinction between Application and No-Application Understandings.
According to "commitmentarianism," a present-day political community is bound by commitments made in the past because self-governance is a temporally-extended process of making commitments and being bound by them after the committing
generation has passed (pp. 96-98). The obligation to honor those
commitments separates the paradigm case method from nonoriginalist modes of interpretation. But Rubenfeld's method is
also different from originalism because it enforces only those
special obligations that rise to the level of a constitutional commitment-the intentions of the framers count for nothing because they could not have foreseen what the commitments they
made might ultimately entail.
"Commitments," he writes, "create-or seem to createobligation. Mere intentions do not" (p. 73). Thus, when one
commits to another, or to oneself, that action, according to
Rubenfeld, signifies a level of obligation that merely intending to
do something does not. "To commit oneself is to engage in a
special normative operation that goes beyond intending, through
which one imposes obligations on oneself over time" (p. 99).
Further, that obligation is recognized as valid and binding at
some point in the future, even when the immediate preference is
to do something else. 7
Our political commitments are reflected in our written Constitution. Creating commitments and obligations over time,
Rubenfeld believes, is what constitutes real political freedomundertaking the actions of self-government that owe duties to
the past even as we constantly look to the future. "We live committed lives," he writes; one facet of the committed life is selfgovernment, which "requires a practice of making and keeping
commitments" (p. 89). Constitution-making is simply this idea of
self-government writ large, with entire communities makin~ and
obeying commitments, even commitments made in the past. For
7. Seep. 73 ("An agent makes a commitment precisely in order to lay an obligation on himself, and this obligation is supposed to govern his future conduct even in the
face of a later contrary preference.").
8. P. 96:
American constitutionalism is a practice through which a democratic nation
seeks to govern itself by making and living up to its own enduring commitments,
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Rubenfeld, this free choice to commit, and then obey those
9
commitments over time, constitutes true autonomy. As he puts
it later in the work:
Understanding American constitutionalism, both descriptively and normatively, requires us to embrace a temporally
extended picture of self-government. This idea of selfgovernment over time in turn implies a central place for
commitments. Rejecting the presentist conception of selfgovernment means that democracy does not consist ideally of
governance by present democratic will, but also, in fundamental part, of adhering to the nation's fundamental, self-given
commitments over time. Only this commitment-based account
of constitutional democracy explains the Constitution's continuing authority today. That is why commitmentarianism is
the right lens through which to read the Constitution
(p. 112). 10

The distinction between commitments and intentions operates in the realm of constitutional interpretation as well, for
Rubenfeld invokes this dichotomy to justify his distinction between Application and No-Application Understandings. The latter "are never commitments" and thus may be freely ignored by
judges interpreting constitutional provisions (p. 99). Application
Understandings, on the other hand, represent the concrete fact
situations that gave rise to the obligations reflected in the Con-

even in the face of contrary majority preferences at one moment or another.
Our constitutionalism ... stands for a form of democracy that rejects presentism.
9. P. 91:
(A] person's freedom ... is bound up with his capacity to give his life purposes
of his own making and to pursue those purposes over time. This freedom is
called autonomy or self-governance. A self-governing agent does not act merely
on his present preferences. He will have given himself his own ends and held
himself to those ends over time.
10. This notion of constitutional democracy as a temporally-extended project where
the past restrains, to some extent, the wishes of present majorities, is why Rubenfeld
finds the "dead hand" argument unavailing. "On the temporally extended conception of
self-government," he writes in response to the argument that the Framers, being dead,
cannot commit anyone to anything, "one way a nation gives itself law is by making constitutional commitments in the past and holding itself to them over time." (p. 135). Rejecting the commitments the Framers made, and to which we are presently committed, he
continues, would require "replac(ing] the rejected constitutional commitments with
other, enduring commitments, which would in turn exert authority over the next generation of Americans, after we had died, unless and until they rejected them." (p. 141 ).
While an "earth belongs to the living" approach to government may be better than the
cornrnitmentarian scheme he favors, Rubenfeld suggests, by way of confession and
avoidance, that "those who argue for government by present popular will have stepped
outside the enterprise of self-government embraced by American constitutionalism for
the last two hundred years." (p. 141).
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stitution in the first place; thus, they should command the respect of judges, who should honor those commitments despite
strong majoritarian sentiment to disregard them (p. 99).
To understand precisely how this works, consider
Rubenfeld's example of the Fourteenth Amendment. The consensus, while by no means universal, 11 is that the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not understand that Amendment to
require the immediate desegregation of public schools. 12 There
is, however, nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment that speaks
to the question of public school segregation; rather, the language
of that Amendment both guarantees "privileges or immunities"
against state interference and enjoins states to extend "equal
protection of the laws" to all persons within their jurisdiction. 13
For Rubenfeld, the latter guarantees are the commitment; the
former understanding that segregation would not be affectedhowever important to the ratification of the Amendment it
might have been-was a mere No-Application Understanding
that the Amendment did not require desegregation of public
schools and was subject to being discarded at some point in the
future. It did not, he stresses, commit states or judges to the continued segregation of schools (pp. 43-46).
As he explains, a "prohibition against x, understood not to
apply toy, implies no commitment to doing y" (p. 100). Nor does
it even imply "a commitment to the permissibility of y" because
it is not a commitment of any sort (p. 100). "No-Application
Understandings, even of commitments, are not themselves
commitments. They are, precisely, understandings of what the
agent has not committed himself to, so far as this commitment is
concerned. They reflect ... at most, an intention not to be committed" (p. 101). Commitments to do something, or to allow
something to be done-like requiring the segregation of public
schools or permitting states to maintain segregated systemscould be made, but to be regarded as "commitments," they
would need to be made explicit in the Constitution (p. 103).
Similarly, he holds that assurances given about the scope of
a commitment's applicability-think, for example, about the assurances given that ratifying the Equal Rights Amendment
11. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions,
81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995).
12. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Desegregation Decisions, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1955). Note that Bickel concluded that the Framers
might not have intended to entrench segregation forever either. /d. at 61--{i3.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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would not lead ineluctably to gay marriage, unisex bathrooms,
and the like-also count for naught because they are not commitments either (pp. 102, 104). The inability to limit commitments ex ante, he says, makes his "commitmentarian" approach
different than originalism. "Originalism requires adherence, to
the greatest possible extent, to all the 'founding' intentions.
Commitment-based interpretation, by contrast, has no special
regard for the original No-Application intentions, which were
not commitments" (p. 106).
Application Understandings, on the other hand, represent
commitments because "the agent centrally intends to be imposing on himself an obligation not to engage in some specific
course of action by committing himself to a more general prohibition (of which the specific course of action is the definitive,
paradigmatic instance)-the Application Understanding is itself
a commitment" (p. 117). As it happens, there were specific,
paradigm applications of the general prohibitions and powers
detailed in the Constitution (p. 119). "Where the Constitution's
commitments have core paradigm cases, they require precisely
the interpretive asymmetry observed throughout constitutional
doctrine. The foundational Application Understandings bind because they are themselves commitments, even while the NoApplication Understandings can be cast aside" (p. 119). This
holds true even if the original Application Understanding turns
out to be mistaken (p. 129).
Rubenfeld's distinction between intentions and commitments is central to his theorr That distinction will not, however,
be the focus of my critique. 1 I will focus instead on the problems
arising from any attempt to employ Rubenfeld's paradigm-case
method in constitutional interpretation. These difficulties, I argue in Part III, mean not only that Rubenfeld's theory fails to
avoid the problems of either originalism or another nonoriginalist approach to interpretation, but in fact may combine
the worst features of both. The next Part, however, describes the
paradigm-case method in more detail.

14. For critical appraisals of Freedom and Time, where Rubenfeld discussed his distinction in more detail, see Erwin Chemerinsky, A Grand Theory of Constitutional Law?
100 MICH. L. REV. 1249 (2002) (book review); Michael J. Gerhardt, The End of Theory,
96 Nw. U. L. REV. 283 (2001) (book review). A more positive review can be found in
L.H. LaRue, The Self That Governs, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 225 (2002) (book review). The
Fordham Law Review also sponsored a symposium on Rubenfeld's book, along with
Christopher Eisgruber's book Constitutional Self-Government. See Symposium, Theories
of Constitutional Self-Government, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 1721 (2003).
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II. UNCOVERING THE CONSTITUTION'S
"KILLER APPS"
"Reasoning from paradigm cases," Rubenfeld writes, "is the
primary business of constitutional interpretation" (p. 16). While
paradigm shifts occur when "judges periodically tear down the
interpretive paradigms they have constructed, replacing them
with new ones . . . constitutional law retains its fundamental
structure: it remains organized around historical Application
Understandings, while No-Application Understandings are left
behind" (p. 17). 15 Rubenfeld's project is to produce criteria by
which constitutional paradigm shifts may be evaluated (p. 17).
"Judges who engage in radical reinterpretation of the Constitution must still answer to the Constitution's foundational paradigm cases. The new doctrine labors under the continuing obligation to do justice to the paradigm cases-or, more precisely, to
do justice to the text in light of its paradigm cases" (p. 17). Understanding the role that these paradigm cases play in constitutional law is the key, argues Rubenfeld, to explaining what appears at first glance to be doctrinal incoherence and to justifying
some of constitutional law's hardest cases, like Brown. 16
The Application Understanding of a constitutional right reflects "specific understandings of what a constitutional right prohibits" (p. 14). Conversely, a No-Application Understanding is
what the constitutional provision does not (at least explicitly)
prohibit (p. 14). In discussions of constitutional powers, Application Understanding refer to what the power was understood to
permit. No-Application Understandings, on the other hand, refer
to "original understandings of what a particular Article I power
did not authorize Congress to do" (p. 49). Rubenfeld claims that
"where constitutional doctrine has departed from important historical understandings, it has virtually always departed" from
No-Application Understandings (p. 13).
One of the challenges of Revolution by Judiciary is the
opaque terminology Rubenfeld employs to describe his con-

15. Later, Rubenfeld makes clear what is suggested here: Reasoning outward from
paradigm cases follows the conventional common law model of legal reasoning. See p. 43
(noting that reasoning from paradigm cases "exerts a kind of hydraulic normative force.
It pushes outward, in the familiar common-law style, available for the next set of plaintiffs as a basis for argument. Paradigm-case reasoning is common-law reasoning; it is the
font of constitutional law's common-law-ishness.").
16. P. 18 ("Once we see the fundamental structure of constitutional interpretation,
the revolutionary holding in a case like Brown will no longer seem difficult to justify as a
matter of interpretation.").
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cepts. Fortunately, he does provide specific case studies attempting to illustrate paradigm cases and Application Understandings
of particular constitutional rights and powers. Below, I have
highlighted a few of the doctrinal areas Rubenfeld uses both to
illustrate the paradigm-case method and to bolster his argument
that the method reflects what the Supreme Court already does,
at least implicitly. Free speech, takings, and equal protection are
discussed first, followed by an application of the paradigm-case
method to the commerce clause and to separation of powers
questions.
A. RIGHTS

1. Free Speech-Given the variety of things that it protects,
from profanity and pornography to nude dancing and flag burning, "contemporary free-speech law spurns a vast range of original No-Application Understandings" (p. 21). In other words, no
one would have understood the First Amendment to prohibit
governmental regulation of much of what it now protects. Two
Application Understandings-derived from historic events that
served as paradigm cases-are, however, still a part of First
Amendment doctrine: the ban on prior restraints and a ban on
prosecutions for "seditious libel" -for criticizing the government
or its officials (pp. 21-23). Not only have these two core applications remained, the Court has relied on both as justification for
its strict scrutiny of content-based regulations of speech.
Rubenfeld explains:
The concept of prior restraint was limited to laws that restrain
speech before utterance, but it had no inherent subject-matter
limitation (it was not limited, for example, to political
speech). The prohibition of sedition laws stretched beyond
prior restraint, but it was limited by subject matter (applying
only to speech criticizing government officials or policy).
When, however, these two paradigm cases are put together,
the First Amendment can become a bulwark against all state
efforts to impose orthodoxies on individuals' opinions, regardless of the subject matter and regardless of whether the
restrictions apply before or after the speech has been uttered
(p. 27).

Thus reinterpreted, there followed "a revolutionary shift in
free-speech law," opening protection of all sorts of speech not
deemed protected at the time of the First Amendment's ratification (p. 28). While "modern freedom of speech cannot be reconciled with the original No-Application Understandings" it "ad-
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heres to and builds on the historical Application Understandings" (p. 29).
2. Takings- Rubenfeld argues that his theory is particularly
helpful when one considers an area of law, like takings, that "is
often said to be so confused that [it] is almost unintelligible"
(p. 35). For example, the Court's decision in Pennsylvania Coal
17
Co. v. Mahon, which set the Court down the path of "regulatory takings," inaugurated a particularly troublesome line of
doctrine (p. 35). 18 But as Rubenfeld notes, "takings law routinely
allows government to destroy the economic value of people's
property without compensating them" (p. 36), while in other
cases a regulation that destroys the economic value of property
will be held to be a taking requiring compensation. Familiar examples from the case law in which compensation is not owed include grohibition laws that destroy the value of a brewery or distillery 9 and destruction of diseased trees to protect healthy trees
nearby? 0 What is the difference between those uncompensated
regulatory actions and the Pennsylvania law in Mahon, requiring
coal companies to mine so as not to cause subsidence to adjacent
property owners, which, the Court held, went too far?
According to Rubenfeld, sorting out Application and NoApplication Understandings is key to understanding the doctrine.
It was well-understood at the time of the Framing that government confiscation of one's property for use by the ~ublic (the
eminent domain power) required just compensation. 1 Eminent
domain, in other words, served as the paradigm case informing
the takings clause. On the other hand, "land-use regulations or
other governmental actions that did not involve" actual expropriation or physical possession of the land were No-Application
Understandings (p. 38). While this means that modern regulatory
takings law is inconsistent with a No-Application Understanding,
it is consistent with the Application Understanding.
The takings clause requires not merely that the private
property be taken, but that it be taken for public use.
17. 260 u.s. 393 (1922).
18. P. 35 ("Pennsylvania Coal was one of the first Supreme Court cases to find a
'regulatory taking' -to find, in other words, that a mere regulation of property amounted
to a taking. The difficulty ever since has been to say what it means for a regulation of
property to go 'too far."').
19. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)
20. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
21. P. 38 ("From the beginning and still today, the one clear, unquestioned application of the takings clause is that it requires compensation when the government exercises
its eminent domain power.").
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In traditional cases of eminent domain there is always both a
taking and a using. The government takes over someone's
land or chattel and impresses it into specific, state-directed
use .... But as property regulations became more complex
and pervasive, it became possible for government to accomplish an eminent domain result ... under the rubric of mere
regulation (p. 39).

In Pennsylvania Coal, there was not merely the usual prohibition
of certain activities that is the hallmark of land use regulation;
Pennsylvania's regulation "require[ d] owners of underground
real estate to leave pillars of land intact, in order to support
buildings, streets, or other structures overhead" (p. 39). This distinguishes it from other regulations that "merely deprive[] people of property or property value, but do[] not impress property
into a specific use" (p. 39). Cases in which compensation has
been ordered by the Court, Rubenfeld argues, involve "both a
taking and a using" (p. 40). Thus, "[t]he Court has identified a
distinguishing feature of the takings clause's foundational applications-the element of a using, definitive of the eminent domain power-and built modern doctrine around it" (p. 40).
3. Equal Protection-By now the pattern should be clear,
but let me discuss one more example. For Rubenfeld, the resort
to Application and No-Application Understandings provides a
useful tool for explaining why Brown is an easy case. The classic
paradigm case that informed the framing of the Fourteenth
Amendment was the proliferation of the so-called "Black
Codes," which sought to keep a form of de facto slavery in tact in
southern states following Emancipation. 22 Even a thoroughgoing
originalist like Raoul Berger agreed. 23 "The struggle to abolish
these black codes was famously central to, and definitive of, the
act of constitution-writing that became the Fourteenth Amendment" (p. 41). The Supreme Court itself affirmed this understanding in both the Slaughter-House Casei 4 and in Strauder v.
22. P. 41 ("In 1865, the Southern states began promulgating laws singling out blacks
for unequal treatment in matters of labor, land ownership, criminal penalties, and so
on."). For a description and an account of the origins of the "Black Codes," see ERIC
FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 198201 & 208--D9 (1st ed. 1988); 1 MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF
LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 440-41 (2d ed. 2002).
23. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 19 (1977) (arguing that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment "meant to secure familiar, 'fundamental rights,' and only those, and
to guard them as of yore against deprivation except by (1) a nondiscriminatory law, and
(2) the established judicial procedure of the State.").
24. 83 u.s. 36 (1873).
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West Virginia, where it struck down state attempts to keep
blacks from serving on juries. 25
But nineteenth century rights talk distinguished among civil,
political, and social rights.Z 6 While blacks were to be afforded
equal "civil" rights, few at the time thought that the Fourteenth
Amendment addressed issues like equal political rights (such as
voting, which wouldn't be addressed until the ratification of the
Fifteenth Amendment) and social rights, which included the
right to mix freely with whites. Few Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment would have regarded their support of the Amendment as incongruous with support of segregated schools, which
involved social, not civil rights. Plessy v. Ferguson's notorious
approval of laws enforcing a "separate but equal" existence on
the country's African-American citizens is a stark reminder how
ingrained this distinction was.
For Rubenfeld, however, that trichotomy of rights, the approval of segregated schools, and "separate but equal" were all
No-Application Understandings that Brown was free to disregard in 1954 when it announced an end to state-mandated segregation in schools (p. 46). However jarring this break with the
past was to contemporary observers, Rubenfeld argues that because Brown kept faith with the Application Understandings of
the Amendment, the rest was constitutional chaff.
The key, he argues, is Strauder. Not only did the Court
strike down the prohibition on black jury service, but in doing
so, the Court argued that their exclusion marked them with a
badge of inferiority- the sort of badge affixed by the Black
Codes, which the Amendment was intended to remove.
"Through an interpretation of the black codes, the Court derived
a principle according to which 'legal discriminations' against
blacks 'assert[ing] their inferiority' or 'implying their inferiority
in civil society' were unconstitutional" (p. 43).
Though modest, he argues that Strauder was also potentially
transformative: "[T]here is no difficulty in seeing Brown as an
elaboration on-indeed an application of-Strauder's antiinferiorization principle" (p. 43). Brown kept faith with the
original Application Understandings, as articulated by Strauder;
Plessy held with the No-Application Understandings embodied
25. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
26. For an explanation of this division, see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544
(1896) (distinguishing between political and social rights); McConnell, supra note 11, at
1014-23.
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in the tripartite classification of rights. Brown is now regarded as
iconic, as a "super-precedent" not susceptible to overruling;
Plessy, on the other hand, is derided (pp. 44-45). 27
B. POWERS

1. The Commerce Clause-Originally "the commerce clause
did not empower Congress to regulate most manufacturing, agriculture, or labor relations within the several states" (p. 53), but
after 1937 the Court's interpretation of the clause "demolish[ ed]
earlier No-Application Understandings" (p. 53) until (perhaps
briefly) the Court appeared to call a halt in United States v. Lopei8 and United States v. Morrison. 29 The original Application
Understandings of the clause, Rubenfeld argues were (1) to
grant Congress authority "over all tariffs and commercial transactions that crossed state or national lines" and (2) "to vest Congress with the power to regulate the country's navigable waters,
even when those waters were located within a state" (pp. 53-54).
In particular, Congress possessed the power "to prevent obstructions to those waters," such as bridges (p. 54).
Rubenfeld argues that the power to remove obstructions
from waterways actually laid the groundwork for the Court's
commerce clause revolution, embodied in cases like Wickard v.
Filburn. 3° Critics of Wickard, he argues, ignore
the Application Understanding of the commerce clause just
discussed: the understanding that Congress always had power
to regulate bridges built over navigable waters. What brought
such a bridge within Congress's commerce power was ... the
fact that it might substantially harm interstate commerce. If
we ask for a general rule governing the commerce power that
captures, as a central instance of that rule, a law regulating instate bridges that might obstruct interstate commerce, the rule
cannot be that Congress may regulate only acts that themselves amount to interstate commerce .... A rule that would
capture the Application Understanding is the following: "The
power to regulate interstate commerce embraces the power to
protect that commerce from injury whatever may be the
source of the dangers which threaten it, and to adopt any appropriate means to that end" (p. 55).
27. Cf Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of rhe Desegregation Decisions, 69
YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1960) (stating that laughter is the only appropriate response to the
Court's reasoning in Plessy).
28. 514 u.s. 549 (1995).
29. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). But see Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
30. 317 u.s. 111 (1942).
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So understood, Wickard, although undoubtedly an expansive
construction of the commerce clause, can still trace its roots to
an Application Understanding (p. 55). Though in 1789 this
power may have been understood to stop when waters ceased to
become navigable, and not to apply on land at all, those understandings would have been No-Application Understandings
(p. 56).
2. Separation of Powers- Rubenfeld's discussion of the Application and No-Application Understandings of separation of
powers questions is, by his own admission, complicated and hard
to follow. 31 He contrasts his view to the "strict separationist"
view under which "the Constitution's legislative powers are
granted to Congress alone, the executive powers in Article II to
the President alone, and the judicial power to the courts alone"
(p. 56). He notes that this view casts doubt on many aspects of
the modern administrative state and that the text of the Constitution itself provides little help in resolving these disputes because "virtually every one of the Constitution's power-granting
provisions is grammatically ambiguous, permitting exclusive and
nonexclusive readings" (p. 56).
For example, he writes, "[t]he commander-in-chief
clause ... does not say on its face that only the President may
exercise the powers of commander in chief, but it can be read
that way, and it always has been;" thus "[o]n this view, Congress
could not constitutionally appoint a designated general or bureaucrat to be commander in chief" (p. 56). A nonexclusive
reading of congressional powers is also possible: "[T]he commerce clause could be read as exclusive-only Congress may
regulate interstate commerce-but it is not read that way today"
(pp. 56-57). For example, both Congress and New York can
criminalize the transportation of cocaine into New York (p. 57).
Older cases, Rubenfeld argues, embraced the strict separationist approach. Gradually, however, that view was replaced by
decisions "emphasizing that the three branches can share a great
deal of overlapping, concurrent power, with no 'hermetic' division between them" (p. 57). 32 This relaxed approach to separa31. P. 56 (prefacing the discussion with a warning that "only experts in this field
may want to work their way through the complex arguments that follow").
32. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding federal sentencing commission); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); see also Clinton v. City of
New Yark, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); American Trucking
Ass'n v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953) (refusing to tighten up the non-delegation
doctrine for administrative agencies).
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tion of powers questions has drawn criticism from, among others, Justice Scalia, who favors a bright-line approach. 33 Despite
the criticism, Rubenfeld maintains that current doctrine follows
the Application/No-Application Understandings paradigm.
Application Understandings obtain "when a power was believed to be exclusive and ... prevent[ ed] some other actor ...
from exercising the power in question" (p. 58). Courts are not
free to give these provisions a nonexclusive reading at some later
date. "If the Supreme Court today adopted a nonexclusive reading of the declaration-of-war clause, under which the clause no
longer barred the President from declaring war, the Court would
have surrendered a foundational paradigm case" (pp. 58-59).
The key is "ascertaining whether any core prohibitory Application Understandings can be identified in connection with a given
constitutional power" (p. 59). Such a core prohibitory Application Understanding, in contrast to Congress's power to declare
war, was not present, he argues, in the commerce clause. This
means that "the contemporary nonexclusive reading of the
commerce clause is consistent with paradigm-case interpretation" (p. 59). "[T]here was no foundational prohibitory Application Understanding that requires an exclusive reading of that
clause, and ... the clause is not read as exclusive today" (p. 59). 34
How does this resolve contemporary separation-of-powers
controversies? The absence of prohibitory Application Understandings means that there is no bar to, for example, permitting
states to exercise regulatory or taxing authority over some interstate commerce, authorizing executive officers to legislate, or allowing courts to exercise executive powers (p. 60). "While there
may well have been an original understanding that executive officers or judges would have no constitutional authority to make
law, there was no constitutional commitment enacted prohibiting
them from doing so" (p. 60). Thus, despite criticism from Justice
Scalia and some legal scholars, neither the delegation of rulemaking authority to executive agencies nor the involvement of
judges in the formulation of sentencing guidelines- to give two
33. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 413 (Scalia, 1., dissenting); Morrison, 487 U.S. at
697 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Improprieties: Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison, and Administrative Government, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 357
(1990); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., On the Danger of Wearing Two Hats: Mistretta and
Morrison Revisited, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417 (1997); Symposium, Morrison v. Olson:
Addressing the Constitutionality of the Independent Counsel Statute, 38 AM. U. L. REV.
255 (1989).
34. For my criticism of his conclusion here, see infra notes 40-43, 47-48 and accompanying text.
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examples- violates constitutional Application Understandings,
as Rubenfeld defines them.
But what of the Constitution's vesting clauses, assigning responsibility for the exercise of legislative, executive, and judicial
power with Congress, the President, and the courts, respectively? If, say, executive power vested in the President was truly
exclusive, he "would be very surprised to hear it, given that state
officers, who are not under the President's control" (p. 61) were
expected to execute federal laws if authorized by Congress. Anticipating the argument that the Constitution recognized vertical
and horizontal separation of powers, 35 Rubenfeld responds that
while "this assertion may well be largely correct" it is not binding on judges because it was not an Application Understanding
(p. 61).
If strict separation was an Application Understanding,
Rubenfeld argues, the President could not negotiate a treaty
dealing with foreign commerce since that would conflict with Article l's assignment of power to regulate foreign commerce to
Congress (pp. 62-63).
[T)he right thing to say about the treaty power is this. It is not
in conflict with Article I. Congress's power to regulate commerce with foreign states was not thought to be 'horizontally'
exclusive. Neither that specific grant of power to Congress
nor Article I's vesting clause as such prohibits the President
from making a law that regulates foreign commerce ...
(p. 63).

He concludes that once one applies paradigm case reasoning,
there is no categorical unconstitutionality in administrative
agencies passing laws or adjudicating cases. Nor is there any
categorical unconstitutionality in an independent prosecutor,
who exercises executive authority even though Article II vests
the President with the executive power. Nor is there any fundamental problem with judges participating on commissions
that promulgate sentencing guidelines. These pieces of modern separation of powers doctrine are very difficult to reconcile with originalism, but not with paradigm-case interpretation. The jettisoned historical understandings are NoApplication Understandings, which are not binding (p. 66).
35. P. 61 ("We are asked to distinguish ... between 'vertical' and 'horizontal' separation of powers. On the original understanding, it is said, the powers assigned to the
various branches of the federal government may not have been vertically exclusive (prohibiting state actors from exercising the powers at issue), but they were horizontally exclusive (prohibiting members of other branches from exercising them).").
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As for vertical separation of powers between the states and
the federal government, the Constitution's delegations are nonexclusive as well. Where the framers wished to grant exclusive
power to the federal government, the enumeration of a particular power in, say, Article I, section 8, is followed by an explicit
prohibition in Article I, section 10. Had there been an Application Understanding regarding the exclusivity of congressional
power, those restrictions would have been entirely superfluous
(p. 59).36
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE PARADIGM CASE METHOD
There is no denying that Rubenfeld's theory is elegant:
Take provisions of the Constitution; decide what, in fact, they
were intended to do by reference to historic paradigm cases;
then reason out from those paradigm cases in the familiar common law method to apply the core Application Understanding
prospectively. But upon close inspection, this mode of interpretation reminds one of the joke about the shipwrecked economist,
whose solution to getting at the canned food that had washed
ashore begins, "First, assume the existence of a can opener."
First, identifying and interpreting paradigm cases will not
always be as straightforward as Rubenfeld would have us believe. Second, even once paradigm cases are identified, constructing the proper Application Understandings from them will
again be challenging, as the same historical event could give rise
to multiple interpretations and thus multiple Application Understandings. Not only does Rubenfeld fail to provide a methodology for constructing Application Understandings, but third, he
fails to provide, or even acknowledge the need for, guidance for
choosing among rival Application Understandings. Fourth, there
is the uncertain role that precedent plays in the paradigm case
method: Do court cases become paradigm "cases"? How do
these affect the construction and application of Application Understandings? Finally, there is little in the way of example showing how the paradigm case method works prospectively. At critical junctures, Rubenfeld simply goes silent, leaving us to guess at
the answers to these important questions.
36. P. 59 ("Most of the powers granted to Congress in Article I were probably understood to be nonexclusive. After Article I grants Congress the power to coin money, it
goes on to bar states from coining money. This would have been quite unnecessary if the
granting of the power to Congress had by its own terms been understood to be exclusive.").
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A. IDENTIFYING PARADIGM CASES
In his earlier work, Rubenfeld wrote that "the Constitution's provisions are to be understood in terms of the actual, historical struggles of a particular people to lay down and live out
its own commitments." 37 He regarded these struggles as "foundational paradigm cases ... [that] are nothing other than the
core historical commitments memorialized by the act of constitution-writing in question." 38 Paradigm cases, therefore, precede
the constitutional commitment and inform it. From those paradigm cases arise the Application Understandings that reflect the
paradigm case and enshrine it in a constitutional commitment.
The paradigm cases represent "a fact" about that provision's
meaning. 39 Prevention of future trials like Zenger's represents a
"fact" about the First Amendment's meaning (p. 23); the presence of post-Civil War Black Codes represents a "fact" about
the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning. Both provisions, he argues, mean at least that seditious libel trials and discriminatory
legislation depriving African-Americans of civil liberties were
prohibited.
But in reading his descriptions of paradigm cases, one
quickly realizes that many occurred after a particular constitutional provision was drafted. Rubenfeld says that the Zenger
trial and the Alien and Sedition Acts are paradigm First
Amendment cases. But if Zenger was the paradigm case and, as
Rubenfeld argues, the Application Understanding arising therefrom was "no prosecution for seditious libel," then the fact of the
Alien and Sedition Acts' passage, and subsequent prosecutions
under the Acts, suggest that his account of the First Amendment's Application Understanding is mistaken. Rubenfeld responds that really the election of 1800 was what made prosecutions for seditious libel the paradigm cases (here, literally the
cases brought under the Acts giving rise to the Application Understanding) (p. 24).
Or consider his description of paradigm cases under the
commerce clause. Rubenfeld does not linger to consider "[t]he
most obvious historical application of the commerce clause," i.e.,
establishing "congressional authority over all tariffs and commercial transactions that crossed state or national lines" and
over "the country's navigable waters, even when those waters
37.
38.
39.

RUBENFELD, supra

Id. at 184.
Id. at 183.

note 3, at 183.
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were located within a state" (pp. 53-54). He spends the bulk of
his discussion on another alleged paradigm case: "the understanding that Congress could act to prevent obstructions to
[navigable] waters" like those posed by some bridges (p. 54).
The Application Understanding he derives from this paradigm
case-Congress can prevent obstructions to interstate commerce-he avers, "goes a long way toward exralaining and justifying," among other things, Wickard v. Filburn °(p. 54).
In both examples, Rubenfeld cites as paradigm cases events
occurring not prior to, or even contemporaneous with, the constitutional commitments these events allegedly informed, but
those occurring years or decades later. Whatever might be said
about the election of 1800, it postdated the proposal and ratification of the First Amendment and could hardly serve as a paradigm case for that Amendment. Moreover, Rubenfeld's "preventing obstructions" Application Understanding derives not
from founding-era paradigm cases, but rather from a series of
Marshall- and Taney-era Court cases. 41 Most court cases in those
early years interpreted the scope of the commerce clause as limiting state power, not delineating the power of Congress to act.
In one case in which the Court did address the scope of congressional power, Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge, the
Court upheld Congress's legislative judgment that a bridge previously held by the Court to unconstitutionally obstruct commerce was not an obstruction.42 The Wheeling Bridge case,
though, was decided nearly seventy years after the ratification of
the Constitution; it certainly didn't inform the debates of the
members in Philadelphia.
What's going on here? Rubenfeld seems to treat newlydrafted constitutional provisions like wet cement: Before the pro-

40. 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding application of wheat quota to farmer growing
wheat for personal use).
41. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.)
518 (1852) (ordering removal of a bridge deemed to interfere with interstate commerce);
Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) (concluding that
Delaware dam was not intended to obstruct commerce, but represented valid exercise of
state police power).
42. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 430
(1856) (upholding congressional declaration that bridge did not constitute obstruction to
interstate commerce). For background on the initial determination by the Court, the
congressional reaction, and the Court's reconsideration, see DA vm P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DEMOCRATS AND WHIGS, 1829-1861, at 192-94 (2005);
CARL B. SWISHER, 5 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
TANEY PERIOD, 1836-64, at 408-18 (1974); 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT
IN UNITED STATES HISTORY, 1836-1918, at 233-36 (1926).
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visions' meanings "set," passersby are free to leave impressions in
the cement that will become a part of them once they dry. He sees
"ratification" as a temporally-extended event where a window of
time exists for paradigm cases to emerge and be, in effect, backdated to inform the Application Understandings arising from the
text itself. I say "seems" because Rubenfeld provides nothing to
explain or defend these late-arising paradiim cases and the Application Understandings derived from them. 3
But they need defending. Otherwise it looks as if paradigmcase reasoning begins with where the Court is doctrinally (no
prosecutions for seditious libel) and then reasons backwards until one finds an historical event (the Jeffersonians' attacks on
Alien and Sedition Act prosecutions) that is proximate enough
in time to the Framing to serve as a "paradigm case" giving rise
to an Application Understanding that reflects current doctrine.
B. CONSTRUCfiNG APPLICATION UNDERSTANDINGS FROM
PARADIGM CASES

Even if there is a paradigm case-and there will often be an
historical event that was on at least some framers' minds when
drafting a constitutional provision-one must both interpret that
case and then infer the correct Application Understanding from
it or from the constitutional text spawned by the paradigm case.
This is no small feat, especially since constitutional texts are often written in general terms. The Fourteenth Amendment, for
example, doesn't say anything about Black Codes; it is much
more general than, say, the Thirteenth Amendment, which
makes it pretty clear that the eradication of slavery- by whatever name-is its raison d'etre. 44 I will argue here that Rubenfeld
is not particularly forthcoming about either (1) how properly to
43. This feature of his method is reminiscent of Keith Whittington's theory of extrajudicial constitutional construction. KEITH E. WHI1TINGTON, CONSfiTUTIONAL CONSTRUCf!ON:
DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUilONAL MEANING (1999). Rubenfeld's colleague Bruce
Ackerman explicitly adopts the notion that "the Founding" is a temporally-extended
event in which subsequent occurrences affect (or ought to affect) our understanding of
the Constitution. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS:
JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (2005).
44. The fact that many constitutional provisions are written in such general language raises questions about Rubenfeld's entire project. Given the presence of at least
some amendments-the Thirteenth and Fifteenth come immediately to mind-that were
intended to address certain paradigm cases, slavery, and the disenfranchisement of African-Americans, and written in narrow terms targeting those cases, does it follow that all
constitutional provisions have some historically-discemable irreducible core meaning?
Or does it follow that we should privilege the cases that may have been on the minds of
some framers when they crafted very general commitments?
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understand and interpret paradigm cases or (2) how to divine
Application Understandings from those cases.
The construction of proper Application Understandings is
complicated by the inevitable presence of precedent. In few
cases will an interpreter be writing on a blank slate, constructing
Application Understandings from only the historical paradigm
case itself. Decades-centuries even-of case law will have intervened. Yet Rubenfeld is extremely vague as to how precedent
affects the construction of Application Understandings. This uncertainty may explain why it is so difficult to determine how the
paradigm case method helps to decide cases prospectively, as
opposed to merely providing a plausible way to harmonize seemingly disparate cases within particular doctrinal lines.
1. Interpreting the Paradigm Case and Constructing the Application Understanding- Determining what a particular paradigm case "stands for" and, thus, what its proper Application
Understanding is, seems analogous to determining the holding of
a case or the proper level of abstraction at which to cast the
holding of a case. It may in fact be more difficult since, as
Rubenfeld conceives it, the Application Understanding is a sort
of least common denominator among the drafters and ratifiers
(and, perhaps, early interpreters) of constitutional text. At bottom, though, it is an historical inquiry. However, Rubenfeld has
nothing to say about the methods judges and others should use
in conducting such an inquiry. One is struck by Revolution by
Judiciary's lack of interest in history. If one of the chief complaints about originalism is its tendency to produce "law office
history" or "history lite," 45 it is hard to see how the paradigm
case method avoids these vices. Historical events are rarely
monocausal. Even if one cause predominates, or largely causes a
particular result, can judges be expected to be able to discern
that cause from the background noise of other contemporary
forces and settle on the paradigm case? 46
Consider again Rubenfeld's discussion of the commerce
clause's paradigm case and its Application Understanding mentioned earlier. He argues that perhaps the important paradigm
case of the commerce clause authority concerned empowering

See Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism,
523 (1995).
46. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Verrneule, Interpretations and Institutions,
101 MICH. L. REV. 885 (2003) (arguing that many legal theories of interpretation pay insufficient attention to interpreters' institutional competence).
45.

95

COLUM. L. REV.

102

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 23:81

Congress to remove obstructions to interstate commerce.47 But,
as I also noted, his support for this "paradigm case" came much
later than the Founding Era, in connection with Supreme Court
cases stating that Congress could exercise its power over interstate commerce to reverse a judicial declaration that a state
structure obstructed commerce. 48 Rubenfeld elides these details
and says that removing obstructions to commerce was a paradigm case (p. 54). The resulting Application Understanding is
that the commerce clause authorizes Congress to remove any
and all barriers to interstate commerce. He then argues that this
Application Understanding legitimizes Wickard v. Filburn because Congress, by setting and enforcing quotas for the growing
of wheat to prop up the market price of wheat, was simply removing an obstacle (low wheat prices) to interstate commerce,
Q.E.D. (pp. 54-56).
There is, however, a fair distance between the Court's acquiescence in a congressional declaration that an actual physical
structure did not pose an obstacle to commerce on a navigable
waterway and a decision approving a fine for violation of a quota
designed to prop up farm prices levied on a farmer who grew
wheat locally and consumed it at home (rather than buying the
wheat he needed on the market). To say that both involve Congress "removing obstructions to interstate commerce" and are
thus consistent with the Application Understanding of the commerce clause casts that Understanding at a very high level of abstraction without defending the propriety of such a loose construction of that Understanding.
The commerce clause example nicely illustrates another
problem with Rubenfeld's theory: How does one account for
precedent in the elaboration of Application Understandings?
One answer might be that you wouldn't. Rather, in all cases, you
would start with the constitutional provision, look for the historical paradigm case, and construct an Application Understanding. Intervening cases inconsistent with the Application Understanding, one might reason, would represent No-Application
Understandings one is free to discard, mistaken readings of
paradigm cases, or failure to follow a proper Application Understanding, which ought to be overruled.
But Rubenfeld is no Clarence Thomas, willing to remake
doctrine wholesale when doctrine departs from original under47.
48.

See supra notes 40--43 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 40--43 and accompanying text.
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standing. Rubenfeld instead seems anxious to fit the Application
Understandings to doctrine, instead of the other way around.
Judges, he writes, "interpret constitutional texts in light of their
paradigm cases; in so doing, they build up the interpretive paradigms through which the texts are applied. At the same time,
they lay down new paradigm cases [that] can come to be regarded as landmark precedents" (p. 16).
49
Later in the book, Rubenfeld criticizes Lawrence v. Texas
as being "sadly lacking in terms of constitutional interpretation.
The absence of paradigm-case reasoning in that opinion is an essential part of the problem" (p. 190). One might argue that
paradigm-case reasoning is absent because there is no paradigm
case that was available to the Court. 50 The Fourteenth Amendment said nothing about the sort of liberty interest put forward
by the majority; its own cases, in fact, were quite clear that
criminalizing sodomy was constitutional. 51
But Rubenfeld is no Antonin Scalia, either. Lawrence was
correct, argues Rubenfeld, but the decision was poorly reasoned.
If the Court wished to ground Lawrence in some sort of "right of
privacy," he writes, and "if an explanation of privacy is to have
power in terms of paradigm-case reasoning, it ought both to capture Roe v. Wade and to draw its principles from the Fourteenth
Amendment's core applications" (p. 188). At this point one
might ask how Roe could be a "paradigm case" if Rubenfeld has
already asserted that the paradigm case of the Fourteenth
Amendment was the desire to eliminate the Black Codes and the
resultant Application Understanding either an antidiscrimination or anticaste principle. 52
As it happens, even Roe can be explained in terms of the
elimination of the Black Codes. A "hallmark of female slavery in
the American South ... was its sexual and maternal component.
Slave women were routinely forced to have sex, to bear children,
and to raise children against their will" (p. 188). There is, he
concludes "no difficulty seeing in Roe v. Wade the proposition
49. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
50. /d. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing Lawrence as not having roots in the
Court's own case law, the text of the Constitution, or history and tradition); Nelson Lund
& John 0. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555
(2004) (critiquing Lawrence along the same lines). For a more positive appraisal of Lawrence and its fidelity to what Rubenfeld would identify as paradigm cases of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution:
Lawrence v. Texas, 2002-2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21.
51. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
52. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
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that a free woman cannot be forced into motherhood against her
53
will" (p. 188). This "anti-instrumentalization" principle is at the
heart of Rubenfeld's account of privacy and one that he finds
consistent with his amalgamation of the Fourteenth Amendment's paradigm cases and Application Understandings (p. 188).
At this point, however, one wonders why one using the
paradigm-case method would bother with identifying an historical paradigm case at all. If the goal is, as it seems, to preserve all
the major cases in a line of doctrine by identifying some principle
that all share in common, even if it is one that is ahistorical and
abstract, then there probably isn't a line of doctrine that can't be
rationalized by clever lawyers. Doctrinal manipulation is something at which lawyers and judges excel. Even by the generous
standards of acceptable doctrinal manipulation54 that is the
stock-in-trade of the "common law" method of constitutional interpretation, Rubenfeld's attempt to use an "antiinstrumentalization" theory to span the gap between 1868 and
Roe is a bridge too far. 55
One is tempted to say that Rubenfeld's antiinstrumentalization reading of Roe gives away the game. All the
53. Except that she can, if she attempts to wait until after fetal viability to have an
abortion, in the absence of a threat to her life or health. See Planned Parenthood of Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) Uoint opinion).
54. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965) (striking down
Connecticut ban on use of contraceptives on grounds it interferes with the privacv rights
of married persons). with Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113. 153 (1973) (citing, inter alia, Griswold and Eisenstadt and concluding "ftlhis right of privacy, whether it be founded in the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action.
as we feel it is. or. as the District Court determined. in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people. is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy."), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."). As Charles Fried notes,
individual decisions "may for a time exert their influence in a case-by-case accretion of
precedents in similar circumstances," but eventually, they will "either run out, or, if potent, they invite courts to move to higher levels of abstraction, where more general
propositions are announced, and it is these that begin to take over some of the work of
deciding cases." CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS: THE CONSTITUTION IN
THE SUPREME CoURT 189 (2004). This is what happened on the way from Griswold to
Roe, with Eisenstadt serving as the linchpin. The destination, Fried notes, "is a long way
from the truly anomalous Connecticut statute in Griswold. Just what authority the Court
was claiming for itself in Roe v. Wade and in the name of what doctrine is hard to tell."
/d. at 193.
55. Cf Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, Commentary, A Penumbra Too Far, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1639 (1993) (critiquing Akhil Reed Arnar, Comment, The Case of the
Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124 (1992) (offering
a reading of the First, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments that would permit restriction of "hate speech")).
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talk of honoring past commitments by identifying and applying
specific paradigm cases looks like ornamentation designed to rationalize contemporary results appealing to many law professors.
Or perhaps it highlights a flawed assumption in Rubenfeld's theory: that constitutional doctrine conforms, generally, to Application Understandings of paradigm cases. 56 Beginning with that assumption, or with the related assumption that particular cases
are rightly decided, would seem to encourage hindsight bias in
the selection and interpretation of paradigm cases, and in the
construction and elaboration of Application Understandings. Either, it seems to me, compromises the paradigm-case method as
the method of constitutional interpretation.
2. Choosing Among Rival Application UnderstandingsThe difficulty of discerning through time a single cause or case
that gave rise to constitutional text and reconstructing the minimal commitment or set of commitments framers thought they
were making through that text is daunting enough. It will frequently happen that the difficulty is compounded because of the
possibility of rival Application Understandings being created
from the same historical materials.
Rubenfeld again has nothing to say about how one is to establish the Application Understanding of particular provisions
without wading into historical controversy. His authority for the
Application Understandings he cites is scant; much of it reads
like the "every schoolchild knows" type of history. Rubenfeld
offers those who would use his theory no help in choosing between two plausible Application Understandings, though constitutional law is replete with such contested understandings.
Take his example of the First Amendment. He argues that
its Application Understandings included a prohibition on prior
restraint and on prosecution for seditious libel (pp. 22-23). He
alludes to Leonard Levy's argument (p. 23 & p. 208 n.14) that
the First Amendment was understood by the Framers to bar
only prior restraint, and not seditious libel, but then dismisses it,
saying that it became an Application Understanding after the
1800 election, and writing that "Jefferson's victory is widely regarded by contemporary historians as a decisive condemnation
of the Sedition Act and the prosecutions thereunder," citing

56. Rubenfeld apparently believes this to be true. He counts "only two areas of
constitutional doctrine where a foundational Application Understanding could arguably
be said to have been rejected. The first concerns the contracts clause, the second the declaration-of-war clause." (p. 67).
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Levy again (p. 24 & p. 208 n.16). He never resolves the foundingera difference of opinion, but implicitly argues the matter was
settled by Jefferson's election. He then announces that "[t]oday
the unconstitutionality of 'seditious libel' laws is a piece of First
Amendment bedrock, and courts will explicitly say, when they
declare such laws unconstitutional, that they are honoring the
First Amendment's historical meaning" (p. 24, footnote omitted).
Rubenfeld lumps together the establishment and free exercise clauses under the heading "Religious Freedom." Whatever
else the Framers intended to do, he argues, they meant to bar
the establishment of a national church and prohibit involuntary
tax levies to support particular denominations (pp. 30-32). But
again, this cursory treatment ignores historical controversies
over matters such as national acknowledgement of religion and
non-preferential aid to religion- two issues over which the reading of the historical record can yield contradictory answers. 57
Rubenfeld himself acknowledges that "there was no shared
original understanding about the proper overarching shape of
church-state relations" other than the Application Understandings he identifies above (p. 30). Given the state of flux over the
proper relationship he readily concedes, can we be as confident
in any "set of specific, original, core Application Understandings," much less the ones he offers (p. 30)?
Another example of Rubenfeld's failure to acknowledge the
existence of rival Application Understandings, much less provide
a means for choosing between them, occurs in his discussion of
the commerce clause. So eager is Rubenfeld to provide a paradigm case and an Application Understanding that could legitimize Wickard v. Filburn, he largely ignores other possible understandings of both the proper paradigm case and the correct
Application Understanding.
Rubenfeld acknowledges that the commerce clause gave
Congress authority over tariffs and interstate commercial transactions and over navigable waterways (p. 54), but is dismissive of
the notion that the clause is anything other than a power57. One need only look at the majority and dissenting opinions in the Supreme
Court's recent decisions on religious displays and public funding of religious schools to
get a sense of how very differently the Justices approach such questions. See, e.g.,
McCreary County v. A.C.L.U., 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct.
2854 (2005); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). Scholars, too, draw radically different conclusions from the historical materials. Compare PHILIP HAMBURGER,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002) (concluding separation was probably not
intended), with LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGIITS 79-102 (1999)
(arguing for a broad conception of "establishment").
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conferring measure. In his discussion of separation of powers, he
writes that "there does not appear to have been any ... understanding" that "the commerce clause would, by its own terms,
bar states from imposing tariffs on imported goods" (p. 59).
While "the Constitution was understood to stop states form imposing tariffs on interstate commerce . . . the source of that
paradigmatic prohibition was not the commerce clause" (p. 59).
Thus he purports to demonstrate the congruence of current understanding (the commerce clause is not exclusive, barring any
state regulation of interstate commerce) with the paradigm case
resulting in the commerce clause.
There are several problems here. First, Rubenfeld is on
shaky ground when he concludes that the commerce clause was
understood to have little to say about state taxation and regulation of interstate commerce. As Albert Abel concluded over a
half-century ago, Madison was largely correct when he described
the commerce clause as designed primarily to restrain states. 58
Examining the debates from Philadelphia, as well as those in
state ratifying conventions and in some published commentary,
Abel showed that to the extent that the commerce clause was
mentioned at all, it was mentioned in connection with restraining
states. When the affirmative power of Congress was discussed,
most commentators mentioned little more than Congress passing
navigation acts controlling the import and export of goods into
the country. 59 Abel's conclusion was that, to the extent an original understanding could be discerned, the scope of affirmative
federal power granted by the commerce clause-as opposed to
the restraint that it imposed on the states- was small indeed. 60
My own research 61 confirms that of Abel. The Framers were
concerned about interstate commercial discrimination, whose
presence they attributed in part to a lack of centralized authority
over interstate commerce. They assumed, without addressing the
details of operation, that the commerce clause on its own, at least
in part, removed certain commercial matters from the sphere of
state competence. While the commerce clause was not the only
provision addressed to restricting state power over commerce, it

58. See Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and
in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432,469 (1941).
59. I d. at 470--73.
60. !d. at 475.
61. Brannon P. Denning, Confederation-era Discrimination Against Interstate
Commerce and the Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 94 KY. L.J. 37
(2005-2006).
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was thought to play a role. Chief Justice Marshall famously remarked in Gibbons v. Ogden that he leaned toward that interpretation;62 his colleague William Johnson embraced it. 63 As late as
the mid-nineteenth century, the Court was still wrestling with the
exclusivity/nonexclusivity question when rookie Justice Benjamin
Curtis cut the Gordian Knot and proclaimed that the clause was
exclusive with regard to "national" subjects, but not exclusive
when "local" subjects were being addressed. 64
Finally, consider the Second Amendment, an example
Rubenfeld does not use, but which would seem an excellent candidate for application of his theory. Among scholars, there are
few more bitterly contested questions in contemporary constitutional law than the scope of the Second Amendment. 65 If one
was to use Rubenfeld's theory to interpret the Amendment in
light of a hypothetical federal gun control ordinance, then the
accurate description of the paradigm case and the Application
Understanding is of crucial importance. Here again there are
competing models. One reading of the amendment, dubbed the
"Standard Model" by Glenn Reynolds, 66 posits that the Application Understanding was that the Amendment prohibited Congress from regulating privately-owned firearms to the extent
they would be unavailable for individual or collective selfdefense.67 Even Standard Modelers, however, might differ on the
precise point at which governmental regulation would become
an infringement on the right to keep and bear arms.
Others, however, argue that that Standard Model is incorrect; they contend that the correct Application Understanding of
the Second Amendment was that it prohibited Congress from
disarming or abrogating state militia, which were intended to be
62. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
63. ld. at 222-39 (Johnson, J. concurring). See generally Norman R. Williams, Gibbons, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1398 (2004).
64. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851).
65. U.S. CONST. amend. II ("A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.").
66. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN.
L. REV. 461, 464--71 (1995) (describing the "Standard Model of the Second Amendment"). The contemporary status of the debate is nicely captured in Stuart Banner, The
Second Amendment, So Far, 117 HARV. L. REV. 898 (2003) (reviewing DAVID C.
WILLIAMS, THE MYTHIC MEANINGS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: TAMING
POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC (2003)).
67. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 66, at 475-88 (summarizing the scope of the
Standard Model); see also Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original
Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 257-fJ7 (1983) (sketching an
individual rights model of the Second Amendment).
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the cornerstone of national defense. 68 This reading would leave
private ownership of firearms wide open for governmental regulation. To the extent that the militia-as originally understood
by the Framers-has disappeared as an institution, the Amendment mi&ht even have long ago ceased to have any enforceable
content. There is little, if any, middle ground between the contending positions. 70
The choice of contending Application Understandings is the
choice between casting the Second Amendment as a potentially
robust individual right or as a constitutional anachronism, devoid of any contemporary relevance much less any judiciallyenforceable content. It is striking, given how much rides on the
choice of Application Understandings and the prevalence of
controversies over the scope of the commitments made in the
Constitution, that Rubenfeld has so little to say over how to
choose among competing Application Understandings when he
emphasizes that "constitutional provisions have core, historical
meanings, impervious or almost impervious to judicial rewriting,
given by the concrete political battles fought and won ... in the
nation's revolutionary past" (p. 17). Deciding what those "core,
historical meanings" are, in fact, seems to lie at the heart of his
project. His failure to engage the issue represents another crucial
omission in his theory.
The point is not whether Levy, Abel and I, or the Standard
Modelers, on the one hand, or Rubenfeld or anti-individual
rights interpreters of the Second Amendment, on the other, are
correct. Rather, the point is that there are competing paradigm
cases and thus, competing Application Understandings for many
(perhaps most) important constitutional provisions. What is surprising is not so much that Rubenfeld has a version of constitutional history that he thinks correct, but rather that he barely acknowledges the existence of respectable differences of opinion,
much less defends his version against viable competitors or offers guidelines for selecting among them.

68. For a collection of anti·individual rights views on the Second Amendment, see
Symposium, The Second Amendment: Fresh Looks, 76 CHI.·KENT L. REV. 3 (2000); see
also WILLIAMS, supra note 66. A critical take on the "collective rights" interpretation is
found in Glenn Harlan Reynolds & Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment and States'
Rights: A Thought Experiment, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1737 (1995).
69. See WILLIAMS, supra note 66, at 69-96.
70. But see Laurence H. Tribe & Akhil Reed Amar, Well Regulated Militias, and
More, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1999, at A31 (arguing that Second Amendment guarantees
individual right, but that right, like all rights, is subject to reasonable regulation).
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It is clear that Rubenfeld is not so much concerned with
American Historical Association-approved historical accuracy71
as with what another informed commentator might term the
"truthiness" 72 of his constitutional history. Rubenfeld seeks an
account of history that calibrates current doctrine with Application Understandings. No matter how incomprehensible doctrine
appears, Rubenfeld argues, it just so happens that the Supreme
Court regularly keeps faith with constitutional Application Understandings. But this introduces the possibility of bias. Given
the choice of plausible accounts of constitutional texts, the
"right" one, from Rubenfeld's perspective, is the one that will
validate the course the Court subsequently took. But in what
sense can the Court (or Rubenfeld) truly be said to be honoring
the Constitution's deep commitments unless one is prepared to
argue that the Court, despite doctrinal twists and turns, always
ends up on the side of constitutional commitment, with time
winnowing out No-Application Understandings? Perhaps that
could be proven empirically, but Rubenfeld's selective survey of
doctrine doesn't carry the burden of persuasion.

C. PROSPECfiVE APPLICATION OF PARADIGM CASES

Earlier I discussed the difficulty of constructing an appropriate Application Understanding from individual paradigm
cases. As one looks to apply the paradigm-case method prospectively, a related problem appears. How does one fashion rules
from an Application Understanding or a set of related Application Understandings (or from their antecedent paradigm cases)
for use in similar, but not identical, cases arising in the future?
Rubenfeld explicitly disclaims any attempt "to say here how
courts go about the business of extrapolating rules or principles
from paradigm cases" (p. 123). The only hint comes earlier,
when he writes that ''[r]easoning from paradigm cases is a variegated business-incorporating considerations of text, policy, and
justice; requiring ineluctably normative, even ideological judg71. He makes clear at several points that his methodology is concerned with something deeper than mere "original intent;" he aims to get at the core commitments of the
Framers-even, apparently, if they were unaware of the depth of their commitment. See
p. 106 (contrasting commitmentarianism with original intent).
.
72. Truthiness is the quality by which a person purports to know somethmg
emotionally or instinctively, without regard to evidence or to what the
person might conclude from intellectual examination. Stephen Colbert
coined this definition of the word during the first episode (October 17,
2005) of his satirical television program The Colbert Report, as the subject
of a segment called "The Wl')rd."
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki!fruthiness (last visited Jun. 30, 2006).
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ment- but it is the primary business of constitutional interpretation" (p. 16).
If he is not going to give us explicit direction as to how to do
this, how can we ascertain whether it is being done well or
poorly? Only in a final, brief chapter does he look at the Court's
current jurisprudence in a few areas and assess it in light of the
paradigm case method. There, he offers a peek at the paradigmcase method's operation by analyzing recent Court decisions on
privacy, congressional power under the commerce clause, and
affirmative action; the results serve largely to reinforce the foregoing criticisms.
1. Lawrence and the Right of Privacy-As noted earlier,
Rubenfeld criticizes the Court's recent decision in Lawrence as
an unsatisfying example of constitutional interpretation in general and its failure to shore up its holding "by paradigm-case reasoning" (p. 184). Rubenfeld is skeptical that, by holding Texas
had no legitimate governmental interest in prohibiting homosexual sodomy based on its citizens' moral disapproval, the
Court truly intended to construct a new paradigm for privacy
cases around the notion that states may not legislate for moral
reasons (pp. 185-86).
If it did, Rubenfeld continues, it failed to include paradigm
cases to support the Court's decision. "The Lawrence opinion,"
he writes, "presents itself as an interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but one searches that opinion in vain for any sign
of an interpretive engagement with the text of that amendment
or its paradigm cases" (p. 186). This is a curious criticism because Rubenfeld then declares that Roe v. Wade 73 is "one paradigm case most associated with, and most definitive of, the right
of privacy" but that Lawrence's putative "no-legislating-morality
principle" doesn't encompass Roe (pp. 186--87). But Roe, like
Lawrence, represented a marked departure from prior cases itself. One searches Roe in vain for paradigm cases. In fact, Roe is
notorious for its studied indifference to the constitutional
source-text, history, paradigm case, or what have you-of the
fundamental right it declared. 74
Rubenfeld offers one, though. Roe, he argues, is consistent
with an "anti-instrumentalization" principle he derives from an
73. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
74. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf' A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 947 (1973) (complaining that Roe "is not constitutional law and
gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be").
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aspect of the anti-discrimination paradigm case of the Fourteenth Amendment: prohibiting the forced childbearing endured
by female slaves. This paradigm case, for which he offers no historical evidence, I have already criticized. 75 I cite it again, however, to highlight the difficulty one would have in applying his
method prospectively. The anti-instrumentalization principle's
constitutional pedigree is no better than, and the principle itself
is at least as malleable and difficult to apply as, the putative "nolegislating-morality" principle of Lawrence.
Rubenfeld is surely correct "that American constitutional
jurisprudence has never embraced the principle that government
may not 'legislate morality'" (p. 189). But, at least as Rubenfeld
seems to use it-as a principle that "condemn(s] all state efforts
to force particular occupations on individuals, or otherwise to instrumentalize them as masters could do to their slaves"
(p. 188)-I'm doubtful our jurisprudence has ever embraced the
anti-instrumentalization principle either. The draft, for example,
stands as a glaring exception;7 so, too, perhaps do laws mandating school attendance or compulsory vaccination. And let us not
forget that the U.S. Supreme Court has also countenanced the
forced sterilization of the "feeble-minded. "77 Perhaps I have
misunderstood Rubenfeld's use of the term "instrumentalization," but he fails to provide a more detailed definition.
2. Lopez, Morrison, and the Commerce Clause- Rubenfeld
also criticizes the Court's (perhaps shortlived78 ) attempt in
United States v. Lopez 79 and United States v. Morrison 80 to impose limits on Congress's commerce power as inconsistent with
the commerce clause's paradigm case (p. 191). Returning to his
assertion (hedged here) that preventing obstructions to interstate commerce was a "very early and probably foundational application" of the commerce clause (p. 191, emphasis added),
Rubenfeld dismisses Lopez and Morrison's concern with the
presence or absence of economic activity before sanctioning the
regulation of intrastate activities substantially affecting interstate
commerce. 81 According to Rubenfeld, "in this paradigm case
75. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
76. See The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (upholding the
constitutionality of conscription).
77. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927).
78. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
79. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
80. 529 u.s. 598 (2000).
81. See id. at 610 (calling the economic/non-economic distinction "central" to the
decision in Lopez).
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[i.e., removing obstructions to interstate commerce], Congress's
power arises from the effect on interstate commerce, not from
the notion that the bridge was itself 'economic in nature' (which
it may or may not have been)" (p. 191). Thus, "Congress clearly
acts within its commerce power when it regulates in-state activity
to eliminate injuries to interstate or international commerce"
(p. 193). He goes on to propose an intent test for the commerce
clause: Congress can "indeed potentially reach virtually all activity under the commerce clause, but only so long as that activity
threatens adverse effects on commerce and only to the extent
that Congress is genuinely seeking to redress those effects"
(p. 193).
The criticism of Lopez and Morrison is ironic given
Rubenfeld's earlier concern with having Application Understandings incorporate and reflect subsequent precedent. Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Lopez may be criticized on a
number of grounds, but it was an impressive attempt at synthesis
that incorporated existing case law without surrendering the
premise that there were judicially enforceable limits on congressional power.
Rubenfeld's criticism also belies a lack of sensitivity to the
test that Lopez and Morrison actually produced. The Court
readily conceded that Congress has (and has had for nearly a
century) power over the channels of interstate commerce, including people and things moving therein, as well as power to
regulate instrumentalities of interstate commerce. 82 This power
exists regardless of the reason for the regulation, and without regard to whether the channel or instrumentality was located in a
single state. This power, moreover, results from a straightforward reading of the commerce clause and the necessary and
proper clause. Thus, Lopez and Morrison's tripartite divisions of
congressional authority-two of which in no way depend on the
commercial or economic nature of the regulated activity-neatly
reflect what Rubenfeld regards as a paradigm case, without the
problems endemic to the purpose-based inquiry he proposes. 83
82. See id. at 608-09; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
83. Rubenfeld concedes that "[n]otwithstanding the Lopez rule," Congress could
prohibit construction of a bridge under its power to regulate the channels of interstate
commerce. (p. 231 n.7). Yet he complains that "the Lopez rule misunderstands the
circumstances in which an effect on commerce justifies an exercise of Congress'
commerce clause power." !d. Shortly thereafter he writes that "[t]he absence of a
purpose-based limitation explains what is wrong with both the Lopez Court's economicactivity rule and its exemption for laws regulating the 'use of the channels' of interstate
commerce .... " (p. 231 n.lO). As an example, he offers a law prohibiting persons entering
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Were Rubenfeld's purpose-base test adopted, it would seem
to reverse at least a century's worth of precedent. For example,
it is difficult to see what harm to interstate commerce is produced by child labor, convict-produced goods, and the like. The
ban on goods produced by children was undertaken to right what
was seen as a moral wrong when it was first proposed in 1907,
not to protect commerce from some harm; a version barring
from interstate commerce goods produced by child labor was finally signed by President Wilson in 1916. 84 It was precisely on
the grounds that Rubenfeld seems to advocate-that the regulation was not of harmful goods, but was instead a pretext-that
the Supreme Court struck down the ban in Hammer v. Dagenhart.85 A decade earlier, dissenters complained that the ban of
lottery tickets upheld in Champion v. Amei6 did not involve interstate commerce at all, but reflected an attempt by Congress to
exercise a police power that the Constitution denied to it. 87 Not
even Justice Thomas denies Congress's power to regulate the
into same-sex marriages from using waterways or airways. Such a law
would be a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce, but it
would not be a valid exercise of the commerce power-precisely because its
purpose was not genuinely commercial or economic in nature. Conversely, a
law prohibiting the noncommercial transport of dangerous explosives on
airplanes is a valid exercise of the commerce power-not because the activity
regulated is 'economic in nature,' and not because a 'channel' of commerce is
involved, but because the law is clearly aimed at preventing harm to interstate
commerce ....
!d. Considering the "channels" and "instrumentalities" to be "exceptions" to the "Lopez
rule" reflects a curious reading of that case. Rubenfeld does not seem to appreciate that
all three categories result in large part from the combination of the commerce power and
the necessary and proper clause.
84. For the background of the child labor law and the ensuing litigation, see
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., 9 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT,
1910-1921, at 447-59 (1984).
85. 247 U.S. 251, 271-72 (1918). The Court wrote that "[t]he thing intended to be
accomplished by this statute is the denial of the facilities of interstate commerce to those
manufacturers in the States who employ children within the prohibited ages. The act in
its effect does not regulate transportation among the States, but aims to standardize the
ages at which children may be employed in mining and manufacturing within the States."
Jd. Later, the Court argued that "[t]he grant of power of Congress over the subject of
interstate commerce was to enable it to regulate such commerce, and not to give it authority to control the states in their exercise of the police power over local trade and
manufacture." !d. at 273-74.
86. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
87. See icL at 364-73 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting); ALFRED H. KELLY & WINFRED A.
HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 587-88
(3d ed. 1963) ("Chief Justice Fuller's dissent ... centered on the intent or purpose behind
the law. The real purpose of the statute, according to Fuller, was not the regulation of
commerce but the suppression of lotteries. The measure therefore constituted a clear
invasion of the police powers of the states under the pretense of regulating interstate
commerce.").
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channels of interstate commerce, including persons and things
moving therein. 88
Rubenfeld does suggest that "it may be that Congress ought
to have power to redress not only potential harms to commerce
but also potential harms caused by commerce," like "environmental degradation" (p. 195). Presumably this could include
harms caused to children by permitting a market for goods produced by child labor to exist. But this seems not only to range far
beyond the paradigm case of obstructing commerce but also to
remove any limits that his purpose-based inquiry places on con.
1power. 89
gresswna
In addition, Rubenfeld never explains how the Court is to
conduct its purpose-based inquiry. How can courts accurately
gauge whether a particular law is pretextual? Conflicts will inevitably arise over the "purpose" of a law. When they do, must the
Court defer to Congress's statement of its purpose? Search for
the "actual" purpose? 9° Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in
McCulloch cautioned Congress that pretextual invocations of
the necessary and proper clause would result in judicial invalidation.91 Yet the Supreme Court has not made Marshall's admonition a robust restriction on congressional power. 92
88. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2229-30 (2005) (Thomas, J. dissent·
in g).
89. For the Hammer Court's response to a similar argument-that the child labor
law was needed to prevent unfair competition between states banning child labor and
those permitting it, see Hammer, 247 U.S. at 273-74 (arguing that "[t]herc is no power
vested in Congress to require the states to exercise their police power so as to prevent
possible unfair competition. Many causes may co-operate to give one state, by reason of
local laws or conditions, an economic advantage over others. The commerce clause was
not intended to give to Congress a general authority to equalize such conditions" and
concluding that "[t]he grant of power of Congress over the subject of interstate commerce was to enable it to regulate such commerce, and not to give it authority to control
the states in their exercise of the police power over local trade and manufacture").
90. Compare United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (holding
that rational basis review requires the Court to take as the "end" of Congress its stated
purpose when assessing rationality of means), with id. at 187 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Court should have ascertained Congress' "actual" purpose in order to
measure the rationality of means against legislative ends). For a brief, yet insightful discussion of the problem with looking for legislative purpose, see JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 125-31 (1980).
91. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,423 (1819) ("Should Congress,
in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are prohibited by the constitution;
or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty
of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an
act was not the law of the land.").
92. Compare Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004) (characterizing
McCulloch as having "establish[ed] review for means-ends rationality under the Necessary and Proper Clause"), with id. at 611 (Thomas, 1., concurring) (criticizing the major-
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When Marshall later tried to use a purpose-based test to distinguish permissible and impermissible state regulations of interstate commerce, it became apparent that a single law can partake of both categories. 93 A congressional statute could be both
an attempt to remove a commercial obstruction and largely addressed to some problem ancillary to its effects on interstate
commerce. Without a rule for distinguishing pure antiobstruction or anti-harm legislation from pretextual ones, courts
will either underenforce the clause by deferring to Congress or
will risk its wrath by second-guessing congressional policy
choices.
3. Grutter, Gratz, and Affirmative Action-Finally, the
Court's recent affirmative action cases94 receive some rough
treatment from Rubenfeld. The result, of course, does notRubenfeld approves of the fact that the Court stepped away
from Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena's 95 rigorous application
of strict scrutiny, at least in an educational setting. 96 But it is only
in spite of the Court's prior decisions, argues Rubenfeld, that the
Court reached the correct decision in Grutter and Gratz (p. 196).
When the Court settled on strict scrutiny as the proper
standard of review for classifications involving race, 97 many understood the Court to be embracing Justice Harlan's "colorblind" theory of the Fourteenth Amendment. 98 Rubenfeld concedes "it is possible in theory to derive either an anti-caste principle of the kind that tolerates affirmative action or a colority opinion for its apparent holding "that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes the
exercise of any power that is no more than a 'rational means' to effectuate one of Congress' enumerated powers").
93. Initially, the line Marshall drew between permissible and impermissible state
regulations of interstate commerce depended on whether the state statute was intended
to be an exercise of the state's police power or whether it regulated interstate commerce
qua commerce. Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245,252 (1829).
94. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
95. 515 u.s. 200 (1995).
96. P. 201 ("[T]he Grutter Court was right to back away from a strict implementation of the strict-scrutiny regime announced in Adarand.").
97. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 221-22; City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Inc., 488 U.S.
469, 493 (1989) (identifying strict scrutiny as the proper standard of review).
98. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[I]n view
of the constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant,
ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our constitution is color-blind, and neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal
before the law."). For articles identifying Adarand with the "color-blind" interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment, see, for example, Koteles Alexander, Adarand: Brute
Political Force Concealed as a Constitutional Colorblind Principle, 39 How. L.J. 367
(1995); Neal Devins, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena and the Continuing Irrelevance
of Supreme Court Affirmative Action Decisions, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 673 (1996).
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blindness principle that cuts against it" from "the Fourteenth
Amendment's paradigm cases" (p. 196). But, he continues,
adopting a color-blind theory produces what he perceives to be
intolerably anomalous results: Many groups, under current constitutional doctrine, are both protected from discrimination and
may be singled out for beneficial treatment. 99 Thus, "color
blindness puts racial minorities in a worse position than that of
other minorities under existing equal protection law" (p. 197).
Here Rubenfeld has a point worth considering. If the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to aid newly-freed slaves, it
seems odd to both ban discrimination against that group and bar
efforts to remedy the effects of their enslavement and subsequent legal subordination. It is also odd that the Court's two
originalists-Justices Thomas and Scalia-do not seem the least
bit interested in the attitude the Reconstruction Congress had
towards what we might now call racial preferences (pp. 196-97).
But the shortcomings of Rubenfeld's paradigm case method all
come together in this final example.
First, Rubenfeld's own distinction between commitments
and intentions might be turned against his argument. Sure, framers of the Fourteenth Amendment likely intended to permit
beneficial legislation to aid African-Americans transition from
bondage to freedom, but their intentions cannot be considered
more than a No-Application Understanding, given their failure
to sanctify that intention in the Fourteenth Amendment's equality commitment. Thus, Adarand was entirely correct to discard
that No-Application Understanding in favor of the nodiscrimination Application Understanding. The commitment
made to color-blindness perhaps operates in a more unyielding
fashion than it was originally intended, but as Rubenfeld points
out earlier, we undertake commitments without being able to
foresee what living up to those commitments will require of us in
the future (pp. 75-76).
There are other problems, too. The inability to resolve the
anti-caste/anti-discrimination interpretation suggests the importance-and the difficulty-of correctly framing the paradigm
case and constructing the proper Application Understanding. It

99. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(striking down a special use permit for a home for the mentally retarded); United States
Dept. Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (invalidating a restriction on a food stamp
program limiting the program to households composed of related persons).
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highlights the failure of Rubenfeld's theory to provide a means
of choosing between two plausible Understandings.
In the case of affirmative action, Rubenfeld tries to resolve
the dilemma by pointing out that one theory-the anti-caste
principle-produces fewer doctrinal anomalies (pp. 197-201).
But to resolve disputes over paradigm cases by choosing the one
that causes the least doctrinal disruption again highlights the uncertain role of precedent in his constitutional theory. Does
Rubenfeld truly think that the Court rarely strays from Application Understandings and thus its doctrine, however it develops,
largely reflects that fidelity? Or does he just think that, cetus
paribus, in choosing paradigm cases and Application Understandings, one should endeavor to incorporate as much existing
doctrine as possible? The former seems implausible. The latter
would seem to undermine the distinction that he makes between
his theory and other non-originalist theories of interpretationthat his theory honors and attempts to remain faithful to historic
commitments made in the past and written into the Constitution.
IV. CONCLUSION
Rubenfeld's interest in grounding Supreme Court decisionmaking in text and history is admirable. (It also suggests the degree to which, in fact, proponents of originalism triumphed. It is
hard to imagine Revolution by Judiciary being written thirty or
forty years ago.) But Rubenfeld's professed concern that interpretive theory honor the past is undermined by his other concerns: the preservation of particular Supreme Court cases like
Roe; lines of doctrine like the post-New Deal commerce clause
decisions; and the defense of controversial new cases like Lawrence and Grutter. The result, in the paradigm-case method,
seems to combine the rootlessness and mutability of nonoriginalist interpretive theories, like Dworkin's "law-asintegrity" theory, with a superficial historicism indistinguishable
from the "law office history" that sets professional historians'
teeth on edge. Like many "third-way" theories, the paradigmcase method seems to combine the worst aspects of the theories
to which it presents itself as an alternative. It seeks legitimacy in
history and text without being willing to subordinate particular
cases-or, indeed, judicial decisionmaking generally-to the discipline of either. When the historical ornamentation is stripped
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away, the paradigm-case method seems little more than a version of common law constitutional interpretation. 100
The questions critics 101 raised about the early version of the
paradigm-case method presented in Freedom and Time are still
present at the end of Revolution by Judiciary. If the paradigmcase method is to win an audience, it appears that another book
will have to be written. 102 In his next book, Rubenfeld should
give a better account of how paradigm cases and Application
Understandings are to be derived. He should provide criteria for
choosing among competing Application Understandings. He
should provide guidance for applying Application Understand-

100. See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).
101. Erwin Chemerinsky, for example, called the description of the paradigm-case

method "sketchy" and complained that "Rubenfeld never explains how a court is to determine the paradigm case for a particular constitutional provision. Equally important,
Rubenfeld never explains the appropriate level of abstraction to use in stating a paradigm case." Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 1261. How, he also asks, "is the choice to be
made as to which is the better 'paradigm case?' Rubenfeld never explains. Nor is there
any explanation as to how courts are to use the paradigm case method, even assuming
that a paradigm case can be discerned." /d. "Absent any description of how to derive and
assess a paradigm case," he concluded, "Rubenfeld's approach adds little except a new
phrase." /d. at 1262.
Mike Gerhardt's review, which also used "sketchy" to describe the paradigm-case
method, Gerhardt, supra note 14, at 324, echoed Chemerinsky's concerns.
Once the Court constructs the "foundational paradigm," the next few steps are
unclear. Presumably, the authority of a foundational paradigm derives from its
consistency or conformity with the basic purpose of a constitutional guarantee.
A paradigm is binding to the extent it has accurately captured the central commitment or purpose underlying a particular constitutional guarantee .... Yet,
the methodology as described does not indicate where or how anything other
than the written-ness of the Constitution, such as constitutional structure or the
actual inscriptions of the Constitution, matter to the explication of a constitutional guarantee or prohibition .... Nor is it clear how one should move from
"the foundational paradigm" to further explication of it. Why not stop once you
have identified the foundational paradigm (as would apparently be the case
with originalism)? It is not clear what else compels the next move .
. . . [T]he challenge of the paradigm case method is to capture precisely the
central commitment underlying a constitutional guarantee in conformity with
the historical struggle giving rise to it and not the interpreter's subjective preferences .... However, the paradigm case method provides no guidance on how
to sort out coinciding, overlapping, arguably conflicting, or multiple purposes.
Moreover, the paradigm case method seems to ignore the likelihood that a
given text reflects a compromise among those who drafted it; merely assigning a
single paradigm to a particular text has the effect of unraveling the compromise
and arbitrarily declaring one constituency victorious.
A further difficulty with the paradigm case method is Rubenfeld's suggestion that in fact the Court has largely adopted the paradigm case method in almost every setting, with the sole exception of affirmative action.
/d. at 324-25.
102. But see DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPARATELY SEEKING
CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002)

(criticizing top-down foundational theories of constitutional interpretation).
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ings prospectively. He would do well to abandon the assumption
that the Supreme Court nearly always preserves Application
Understandings and discards No-Application Understandings,
with the consequence that cases and lines of doctrine must be
preserved. In addition, Rubenfeld should address the institutional competence of judges to perform the intellectual heavylifting that the paradigm-case method seems to entail if it is to be
performed well. 103

103. See generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006) (faulting much contemporary constitutional theory for failing to consider the institutional competencies of interpreters).

